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Standard approaches to the theory of financial markets are based on
equilibrium and efficiency. Here we develop an alternative based on
concepts and methods developed by biologists, in which the wealth
invested in a financial strategy is like the population of a species. We
study a toy model of a market consisting of value investors, trend
followers and noise traders. We show that the average returns of
strategies are strongly density dependent, i.e. they depend on the
wealth invested in each strategy at any given time. In the absence of
noise the market would slowly evolve toward an efficient equilibrium,
but the large statistical uncertainty in profitability makes this noisy
and uncertain. Even in the long term, the market spends extended
periods of time far from perfect efficiency. We show how core
concepts from ecology, such as the community matrix and food
webs, apply to markets. The wealth dynamics of the market ecology
explains how market inefficiencies spontaneously occur and gives
insight into the origins of excess price volatility and deviations of
prices from fundamental values.
market ecology | market efficiency | agent-based modeling
Why do markets malfunction? According to the theoryof market efficiency, markets always function perfectly:
Prices always reflect fundamental values and they only change
when there is new information that affects fundamental values.
Thus, by definition, any problems with price setting are caused
by factors outside the market. Empirical evidence suggests
otherwise. Large price movements occur even when there
is very little new information (1) and prices often deviate
substantially from fundamental values (2). This indicates that
to understand how and why markets malfunction we need to
go beyond the theory of market efficiency.
Here we build on earlier work (3–7) and develop the theory
of market ecology, which provides just such an alternative.
This approach borrows concepts and methods from biology and
applies them to financial markets. Financial trading strategies
are analogous to biological species. Plants and animals are
specialists that evolve to fill niches that provide food; similarly,
financial trading strategies are specialized decision making
rules that evolve to exploit market inefficiencies. Trading
strategies can be classified into distinct categories, such as
technical trading, value investing, market making, statistical
arbitrage and many others. The capital invested in a strategy
is like the population of a species. Trading strategies interact
with one another via price setting and the market evolves as
the wealth invested in each strategy changes through time,
and as old strategies fail and new strategies appear.
The theory of market ecology builds on the inherent
contradictions in the theory of market efficiency. A standard
argument used to justify market efficiency is that competition
for profits by arbitrageurs should cause markets to rapidly
evolve to an equilibrium where it is not possible to make
excess profits based on publicly available information. But
if there are no profits to be made, there are no incentives
for arbitrageurs, so there is no mechanism to make markets
efficient. This paradox suggests that, while markets may be
efficient in some approximate sense, they cannot be perfectly
efficient (8). In contrast, under the theory of market ecology,
trading strategies exploit market inefficiencies but, as new
strategies appear and as the wealth invested in each strategy
changes, the inefficiencies change as well. To understand how
the market functions, it is necessary to understand how each
strategy affects the market and how the interactions between
strategies cause market inefficiencies to change with time. The
theory of market ecology naturally addresses a different set
of problems than the theory of market efficiency, and can be
viewed as a complement rather than a substitute for it.
Here we study a stylized toy market model with three
trading strategies. We approach the problem in the same way
that an ecologist would study three interacting species. We
study how the average returns of the strategies depend on the
wealth invested in each strategy and how their wealth evolves
through time under reinvestment, and how this endogenous
time evolution causes the market to malfunction.
Unlike previous studies that use a market impact rule for
price setting (3, 9), here we use market clearing. This provides
a better model and in some cases leads to substantially different
results. In contrast to market impact, under market clearing,
all the properties of the market ecology depend strongly on
the wealth invested in each strategy.
We show that evolution toward market efficiency is very
slow. The expected deviations from efficiency are typically
substantial, even in the long term, and cause extended
deviations from fundamental values and excess volatility
(which in extreme cases becomes market instability). Our
study provides a simple example of how analyzing markets in
these terms and tracking market ecologies through time could
give regulators better insight into market behavior.
Significance Statement
We develop the mathematical analogy between financial trading
strategies and biological species and show how to apply
standard concepts from ecology to financial markets. We
analyze the interactions of three stereotypical trading strategies
in ecological terms, showing that they can be competitive,
predator-prey or mutualistic, depending on the wealth invested
in each strategy. The deterministic dynamics suggest that
the system should evolve toward an efficient state where all
three strategies make the same average returns. However, this
happens so slowly and the evolution is so noisy that there are
large fluctuations away from the efficient state, causing bursts
of volatility and extended periods where prices deviate from
fundamental values. This provides a conceptual framework
that gives insight into the reasons why markets malfunction.
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Fig. 1. The three trading strategies correspond to noise traders, value investors and
trend followers. They invest their capital in a stock and a bond. The mixture for each
strategy changes with time as strategies accumulate wealth based on their historical
performance.
bond
stock
noise trader
value investor
trend follower
A. Model Description. The structure of the model is schemati-
cally summarized in Figure 1. There are two assets, a stock
and a bond. The bond trades at a fixed price and yields
r = 1% annually in the form of coupon payments that are
paid out continuously. The stock pays a continuous dividend
D(t) that is modeled as an autocorrelated geometric Brownian
motion, of the form
dD(t) = gD(t)dt+ σD(t)dU(t),
dU(t) = (1− ω)dZ(t) + ωdU(t− θ), [1]
where g is the average rate of dividend payments per unit
of time t, σ is the variance, ω is the autocorrelation of the
process, and Z and U are standard Wiener processes. We
approximate the continuous processes by discrete processes
with a time step equal to one day. We use estimates from
market data by Lebaron (10), taking g = 2% per year for
the growth rate of the dividend with a volatility of σ = 6%.
(See reference (11), for example, for a review of the empirical
evidence on dividends).
We use market clearing to set prices. Each asset a has a
fixed supply Qa, but the excess demand E(t) for the stock by
each trading strategy varies in time. We allow the trading
strategies to take short positions and to use leverage (i.e. to
borrow in order to take a position in the stock that is larger
than their wealth). We impose a strategy-specific leverage
limit λ∗. Because we use leverage and because the strategies
can have demand functions with unusual properties, market
clearing is not always straightforward – see Materials and
Methods.
The size of a trading strategy is given by its wealth W (t),
i.e. the capital invested in it at any given time. In ecology this
corresponds to the population of a species, which is also called
its abundance. Unless otherwise stated, we assume profits and
losses are reinvested, so that the wealth of each strategy varies
according to its cumulative performance.
A trading strategy is defined by its trading signal φ(t),
which can depend on the price p(t) and other variables, such
as dividends and past prices. We modify φ by a tanh function
to ensure that the excess demand is bounded and differentiable.
A strategy’s excess demand for the stock is
E(t) = W (t)λ
∗
p(t)
(
tanh (c · φ(t)) + 12
)
− S(t− 1), [2]
where S(t − 1) is the number of shares of the stock held at
the previous time step. The parameter c > 0 determines
the aggressiveness of the response to the signal φ, and is
strategy specific. When the signal of the strategy is zero,
the agent is indifferent between the stock and the bond and
splits its portfolio equally between the two (hence the factor
of 1/2). The leverage λ(t) of a strategy at any given time is
p(t)S(t)
K(t) = λ
∗| tanh (c · φ(t)) + 12 |. This equality holds when
the market clears.
B. Investment Strategies. We study three typical trading
strategies, which we call value investors, trend followers and
noise traders. We make a representative agent hypothesis,
treating each strategy as though it were only used by a single
fund; however, these should be thought of as representing all
investors using these strategies. We now describe each of them
in turn.
Value Investors observe the dividend process, use a model
to derive the value of the stock, and seek to hold more of the
stock when it is undervalued and hold more of the bond when
it is overvalued. The parameters of their model are estimated
based on the historical dividends. However their model is
inaccurate in that it contains estimation errors and it does not
take the autocorrelation of the dividend process into account
(i.e. they assume ω = 0).
Following Gordon and Shapiro (12), the fundamental value
V (t) of a stock is
V (t) =
∫ ∞
t+1
D(t+ 1)egˆτe−kτdτ
= D(t+ 1)
k − gˆ , k > gˆ.
[3]
The parameter k is the discount rate, also called called the
required rate of return. It is the sum of the risk-free rate
and a risk-premium investors expect for the additional risks
associated with the stock. We follow (13) and use a fixed
discount rate k = 2% based on the average rate of return
implied by historical data.
We define the trading signal for the value investor as the
difference in log prices between the estimated fundamental
value V (t) and the market price.
φVI(t) = log2 V (t)− log2 p(t) [4]
This strategy will enter into a long position when the proposed
price is lower than the value estimated by the investor, and
it will enter into a short position when the proposed price is
higher than the estimated fundamental value. The use of the
base two logarithm means that the value investor employs all
of its assets when the stock is trading at half the perceived
value (14).
Trend Followers expect that historical trends in returns
continue into the short term future. Several variants exist in
the literature, including the archetypal trend follower that we
use here (15–18). There is evidence to suggest that trend-based
investment strategies are profitable over long time horizons,
and reference (19) argues that investors earn a premium for
the liquidity risk associated with stocks with high momentum
(momentum trading is a synonym for trend following).
The trend strategy we use extrapolates the trend in price
between θ1 and θ2 time steps in the past as follows
φTF(t) = log2 p(t−θ1)− log2 p(t−θ2), θ1 < θ2. [5]
We choose θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 2 and keep them fixed. This
choice of parameters allows the trend follower to exploit the
autocorrelation that the dividends impart to prices. The trend
followers’ demand is a decreasing function of price. Trend
followers will make profits if there is positive auto-correlation
in the stock’s returns, e.g. due to the dividend process.
Noise Traders represent non-professional investors who
do not track the market closely. Their transactions are mostly
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for liquidity, but they are also somewhat aware of value, so
that they are slightly more likely to buy when the market is
undervalued and slightly more likely to sell when the market is
overvalued. The signal function of our noise traders contains
the product of the value estimate V (t) (which we assume is the
same as for the value investors) and a stochastic component
X(t),
φNT(t) = log2X(t)V (t)− log2 p(t). [6]
The noise process X(t) is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process,
which has the form
dX(t) = ρ(µ−X(t))dt+ γdW (t) [7]
This process reverts to the long term mean µ = 1 with reversion
rate ρ = 1− 6×252√0.5, meaning the noise has a half life of 6
years, in accordance with the values estimated by Bouchaud
(20). W (t) is a Wiener process and γ = 12% is a volatility
parameter, which is twice the volatility of the dividend process.
The parameters of the model are summarized in Table 5.
We have chosen them for an appropriate compromise between
realism and conceptual interest, e.g. so that each strategy has
a region in the wealth landscape where it is profitable.
Results
C. Density Dependence. An ecology is density dependent if
the characteristics of the ecology depend on the populations
of the species, as is typically the case. Similarly, a market
ecology is density dependent if its characteristics depend on
the wealth invested in each strategy. The toy market ecology
that we study here is strongly density dependent.
When the core ideas in this paper were originally introduced
in reference (3), prices were formed using a market impact
function, which translates the aggregate trade imbalance at
any time into a shift in prices. This can be viewed as a
local linearization of market clearing. The use of a market
impact function suppresses density dependence and neglects
nonlinearities that are important for understanding market
ecologies.
In contrast, using market clearing we see strong density
dependence. This is evident in Figure 2, which shows which
strategy makes the highest profits as a function of the relative
size of each of the three strategies. To control the size of
each strategy we turn off reinvestment, and instead replenish
the wealth of each strategy at each step as needed to hold
it constant. We then systematically vary the wealth vector
W = (WNT,WVI,WTF). We somewhat arbitrarily let WNT +
WVI + WTF = 3 × 108, but we plot the relative wealth (as if
the wealths sum to one). The results shown are averages over
many long runs; to avoid transients we exclude the first 252
time steps, corresponding to one trading year.
Roughly speaking, the profitability of the dominant strategy
divides the wealth landscape into four distinct regions. Trend
followers dominate at the bottom of the diagram, where their
wealth is small. Value investors dominate on the left side of
the diagram, where their wealth is small, and noise traders
dominate on the right side of the diagram, where their wealth
is small. There is an intersection point near the center where
the returns of all three strategies are the same, corresponding
to an efficient equilibrium. In addition, there is a complicated
region at the top of the diagram, where no single strategy
dominates. The turbulent behavior in this region comes about
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Fig. 2. The profitability of the dominant strategy in the wealth
landscape. Panel A is a ternary plot which displays the returns achieved by the
strategy with the largest return. The axes correspond to the relative wealth invested
in each strategy. The top corner is pure trend followers, the left corner pure noise
traders, and the right corner pure value investors. The color indicates the strategy
with the highest returns at a given wealth vectorW . The regions colored in red
correspond to the noise traders, blue regions to value investors, and green to the
trend followers. The intensity of the color indicates the size of the average return. The
upper box of panel B shows the average returns to value investors (blue) and trend
followers (green) while holding the noise trader wealth at its equilibrium value of 42%.
The lower box shows the volatility in the returns of each strategy. The horizontal axis
is the relative wealth of the trend follower (top) and value investor (bottom).
because the wealth invested by trend followers is large and the
price dynamics are unstable.
A quantitative snapshot of the average returns and volatility
is given in Figure 2B, where we hold the size of the noise
traders constant at its equilibrium level of 42% and vary the
wealth of the value investors and trend followers. The average
return to both trend followers and value investors increases
monotonically as their wealth decreases. The volatility of
the returns of both strategies, in contrast, is a monotonic
function of the wealth of the trend followers – higher trend
follower wealth implies higher volatility. Although this is not
shown here, the average return of the value investors increases
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strongly with the wealth of the noise traders; in contrast, the
average return of the trend followers is insensitive to it.
D. Adaptation. We now investigate the dynamics of the ecology.
To understand how the wealth of the strategies evolves through
time, we allow reinvestment and plot trajectories corresponding
to the average return from each point W . This is done by
averaging over many different runs. The result is shown in
Figure 3A. Most of the wealth trajectories in the diagram
evolve toward the efficient equilibrium in the center, where
there is a fixed point where the wealths of the strategies no
longer change. At the equilibrium the returns to the three
strategies are all equal to pi = 2.09%, which is slightly better
than simply buying and holding the stock. However, there is
a region at the top of the diagram where the dynamics are
more complicated and a region in the lower left corner where
the ecology evolves toward the boundary of the simplex.
These results give the impression of a smooth evolution
toward a state of market efficiency, but this is misleading. In
fact the dynamics are very noisy, and stray very far from the
deterministic dynamics suggested by Figure 3A. Tracking a few
individual trajectories, as we do in Figure 3B, demonstrates
that the dynamics are dominated by noise due to the statistical
uncertainty in the performance of the strategies. The typical
trajectories bear little correspondence to the deterministic
trajectories of Figure 3A. Furthermore, the evolution of the
wealth is exceedingly slow: Each trajectory spans 200 years of
simulated time. There are substantial changes in the relative
wealth taking place over time scales that are longer than a
century, and the convergence to the equilibrium point seen in
panel A is at best weak and uncertain.
The long time scale for the approach to market efficiency
should not be surprising. As originally pointed out in reference
(3), the large statistical uncertainty in the performance of a
trading strategy implies a long time scale to attain efficiency. A
common way to measure the performance of a trading strategy
is in terms of the ratio of the mean to the standard deviation
of its returns, which is called the Sharpe ratio S. In the ideal
case of a stationary market and I.I.D. normally distributed
returns, the time required to detect excess performance ∆S
with a statistical significance of s standard deviations is
approximately τ = (s/∆S)2. To take an example, a buy and
hold of the S&P index has a Sharpe ratio of roughly S = 0.5. It
thus requires roughly 400 years to confirm the performance of
a strategy that outperforms the index by 20% at two standard
deviations of statistical significance. Furthermore, as shown
in reference (21), because the rate of approach to market
efficiency slows down as it is approached, it follows a power
law of the form t−α, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. For large times this is
much slower than an exponential.
To better understand the long-term evolution, we sample
the space of initial wealth uniformly, simulate the ecological
dynamics under reinvestment, and record the final wealth
after 200 years, as shown in Figure 3C. While the fixed point
equilibrium is contained in the region where the ecology is
most likely to be found, it is not in the center of this region,
and the deviations in the relative wealth of the strategies from
the equilibrium are substantial, often more than 20%.
The autocorrelation of price returns is an indicator of
market efficiency. Efficient price returns should have an
autocorrelation that is reasonably close to zero (close enough
that it is not possible to make statistically significant excess
profits). In Figure 3D we plot the autocorrelation of returns
across the wealth landscape. There is a striking white
band across the center of the simplex, corresponding to
zero autocorrelation. This happens when trend followers
invest about 40% of the total wealth, thereby eliminating
the autocorrelation coming from the dividend process.
E. Community matrix. The community matrix is a tool used
in ecology to describe the pairwise effects of the population of
species j on the population growth rate of species i (22, 23).
As originally pointed out by Farmer (3), who called it the
gain matrix, analogous quantity is also useful for interpreting
the behavior of market ecologies. Assuming differentiability,
let ∆Wi(t) = dWi/dt be the profits per unit time, so that
pii(t) = ∆Wi(t)/W (t) is the return to strategy i, and let the
relative wealth wi(t) = Wi/WT , where WT is the total wealth.
The analogue of the community matrix for market ecologies is
Gij =
∂∆Wi
∂Wj
= ∂pii
∂wj
. [8]
This has units of one over time. The wealth Wi(t) invested
in strategy i replaces the population size of a species. The
second equation makes explicit the sense in which the terms
in the community matrix are like elasticities in economics, i.e.
they measure the response of the returns to relative changes in
wealth. The possible pairwise interactions between strategies
can be classified according to the sign of Gij . If both Gij and
Gji are negative, then strategies i and j are competitive; if Gij
is positive and Gji is negative, then there is a predator-prey
interaction, with i the predator and j the prey; and if both Gij
and Gji are positive, then there is a mutualistic interaction
(24).
Because we do not have a differentiable model for our toy
market ecology, we compute the community matrix numerically
using finite differences (see Materials and Methods). The
community matrix is strongly density dependent. If we
compute the community matrix near the equilibrium point in
the center of the simplex, we get the result shown in Table 1.
The diagonal entries are all negative, indicating that the
strategies are competitive with themselves. This means that
their average returns diminish as the strategy gets larger,
causing what is called crowding in financial markets. We
already observed this in Figure 2. Interestingly, however, the
size of the diagonal terms varies considerably, from −0.89 for
noise traders to −19.3 for trend followers. This means that
we should expect trend followers to experience crowding more
strongly than noise traders.
All the other entries are positive, indicating mutualism.
This implies that every strategy benefits from an increase in
the wealth of any of the other strategies. While we initially
found it surprising that all the strategies could have mutualistic
interactions with each other, on reflection this makes sense:
the ecology is by definition efficient at the equilibrium, and
driving any of the strategies away from equilibrium creates an
inefficiency that provides a profit opportunity for the other
two strategies. (It is not clear to us whether this is specific
to this particular set of strategies, or whether a richer set of
strategies would display more complicated behavior near an
efficient equilibrium).
The community matrix is density dependend. If we compute
the community matrix at the wealth vector given in Table 2,
where the value investors are dominant, there is a shift in the
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Fig. 3. Profit dynamics as a function of wealth. A shows how wealth evolves on average through time under reinvestment. The intensity of the color denotes
the rate of change. B shows sample trajectories for a few different initial values of the wealth vector, making it clear that the trajectories are extremely noisy due to statistical
uncertainty, so that the deterministic dynamics of panel A is a poor approximation. The visualization displays three different initial wealth vectors, each color-coded. The
marker + indicates the initial wealth. The trajectories with the same color follows the system for T = 200 years and color saturation increases with time. Starting from uniformly
distributed initial conditions, C displays a density map of the asymptotic wealth distribution after 200 years. The system is initialized at random with a uniformly distributed
wealth vector and then allowed to freely evolve for 200 years. The darkness is proportional to density. The black dot is the equilibrium point from Panel A. Panel D displays the
autocorrelation in the realized prices.
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Table 1. Estimated community matrix near the equilibrium at W =
(NT = 0.43, V I = 0.34, TF = 0.23).
Gij NT VI TF
NT -0.89% 0.89% 0.82%
VI 26.6% -10.6% 22.4%
TF 11.1% 15.2% -19.3%
Table 2. Estimated community matrix near W = (NT =
0.26, V I = 0.55, TF = 0.19).
Gij NT VI TF
NT -0.46% 0.40% 0.36%
VI 8.94% -0.77% -1.89%
TF 6.81% 6.87% -9.65%
pairwise community relations. As before, all of the terms in
the row corresponding to the noise traders are small, indicating
that the noise traders are not strongly affected by other
strategies, and that they compete only weakly with themselves.
This should not be surprising – the noise traders’ strategy
is mostly random, and is less influenced by prices than the
other two strategies. Value investors, who have the majority of
the wealth in this case, still strongly benefit from an increase
in the wealth of noise traders (though less so than at the
equilibrium). However, there is now a negative term in the
second row, corresponding to the effect of trend followers. In
contrast, from the third row we see that trend followers benefit
from an increase in the wealth of both noise traders and value
investors, implying that trend followers now prey on value
investors. Other variations in community relationships can be
found at different points in the wealth landscape, illustrating
density dependence.
The Lotka-Volterra equations, which describe how the
populations in an idealized predator-prey system evolve
through time, are perhaps the most famous equations in
population biology. Their surprising result is that at some
parameter values they have solutions that oscillate indefinitely.
Using the assumption of no density dependence, Farmer
derived Lotka-Volterra equations for market ecologies (18).
Our results here indicate that the density dependence in this
system is so strong that simple Lotka-Volterra equations are
a poor approximation, at least for this system. The existence
of oscillating solutions in financial markets remains an open
question.
F. Food Webs and Trophic Level. The food web provides
an important conceptual framework for understanding the
interactions between species. If lions eat zebras and zebras eat
grass, then the population of lions is strongly affected by the
density of grass, and similarly the density of grass depends
on the population of lions, even though lions have no direct
interactions with grass. The trophic level of a species is by
definition one level higher than what it eats, so in this idealized
system grass has trophic level one, zebras have trophic level
two and lions trophic level three.
The existence of animals with more complicated diets, such
as omnivores and detritivores, means that real food webs are
never this simple. If we let A(ij) be the share of species j in
the diet of species i, then the trophic level Ti of species i can
be computed by the relation
Ti = 1 +
∑
j
AijTj . [9]
The resulting trophic levels are typically not integers, but they
still provide a useful way to think about the role that a given
species plays in the ecology.
We can also compute trophic levels for the strategies in a
market ecology. We define the analogous quantity Aij as the
fraction of the returns of strategy i that can be attributed to
the presence of strategy j. We do this by simply comparing
the returns of strategy i at wealthW to those when strategy j
is removed, i.e. when Wj = 0 but all the other wealths remain
the same. In mathematical terms,
Aij = max [0, pii(W1, . . . ,Wj , . . . ,WN )− pii(W1, . . . , 0, . . . ,WN )] .
[10]
The maximum is taken so that Aij is never negative. For
computing the trophic levels we only care about the strategies
that i benefits from, not those that cause it losses.
Equations (9) and (10) allow us to compute trophic levels for
each of the strategies. At the equilibrium point, for example,
the trophic levels are (1, 2, 3). In order to better understand
the density dependence, we compute trophic levels at each
point in the wealth landscape. For three strategies there are
3! = 6 possible orderings of the trophic levels. We display the
ordering of the trophic levels across the wealth landscape in
Figure 4.
Fig. 4. A survey of the trophic levels across the wealth landscape.
We color the diagram according to the ordering of the trophic levels of the three
strategies (see legend). Red, for example, denotes the dominant zone where the
noise traders have the lowest trophic level and trend followers have the highest trophic
level (with value investors in the middle). In the grey region there are cycles where
the trophic levels become undefined. The black dots correspond to samples of the
wealth vector after 200 years, as shown in Figure 3(c). The system spends most of its
time in the grey and red zones.
The computation of trophic levels is complicated by the
fact that for some wealth vectors there are cycles in the
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food web. For example, for W = (0.05, 0.15, 0.80), value
investors gain from the noise traders, trend followers exploit the
autocorrelation induced by the value investors, and the noise
traders in turn benefit when the trend follower concentration
increases (generating more volatility), to complete a cycle.
When this happens the trophic levels become unrealistically
large, equation (9) may not converge, and the trophic levels
become undefined. Cycles are not unique to markets – they
can also occur in biology, for example due to cannibalism or
detritovores.
From Figure 4C we know that the most important part
of the wealth landscape is the region around the efficient
equilibrium. A comparison of Figure 5 to Figure 4C makes it
clear that the system spends most of its time in the region in
which the trophic levels are ordered as (Noise Trader, Value
Investor, Trend Follower), as they are at the equilibrium point.
While this is the dominant region, excursions into other regions
are not uncommon.
Given that the noise trader strategy was constructed in
order to represent a non-professional investor, it is natural that
under normal circumstances it sits at the lowest trophic level.
We have assumed here that the initial wealth endowments of
all the strategies are fixed, and the wealth changes only due
to reinvestment. However in reality there will be other inflows
of capital. The noise trader represents market participants
who use the market for other purposes, such as liquidity or
as a default place to put their excess capital. It is thus likely
that the noise trader strategy will have an influx of external
capital regardless of its profitability, and thus might naturally
act as the “basal species" in the ecology. It is reassuring that
the least sophisticated strategy emerges as the one that has
the lowest trophic level under normal circumstances.
G. How ecological dynamics cause market malfunction. The
wealth dynamics of the market ecology help explain why
the market malfunctions and illuminate the origins of excess
volatility and mispricing, i.e. deviations of prices from
fundamental values. Volatility and mispricings are both
functions of time – there are eras where they are large and eras
where they are small. Volatility tends to vary intermittently,
with periods of low volatility punctuated by bursts of high
volatility – this behavior is called clustered volatility. The
standard explanation for clustered volatility is fluctuating
agent populations (15, 25, 26). Our analysis reinforces this
explanation, but gives more insight into its causes. Clustered
volatility can also be caused by leverage (27). While we observe
that clustered volatility increases with increasing leverage, we
have not investigated this in detail here.
Figure 5A presents the variation of the volatility across the
wealth landscape. The landscape can roughly be divided into
two regions. On the lower right there is a flat low volatility
“plain" occupying most of the landscape. On the upper left
there is a high volatility region, with a sharp boundary between
the two. As we will now show, excursions into the high
volatility region cause clustered volatility. A similar story
holds for mispricing.
Figure 5A shows a sample trajectory that begins at the
efficient equilibrium and spans 200 years. The statistical
fluctuations in the performance of the three strategies acts as
noise, causing large excursions away from equilibrium. The
trajectory mostly remains on the volatility plain, but there
are several epochs where it ventures into the high volatility
region causing bursts of high volatility.
The wealth dynamics have strong explanatory power for
both mispricing and volatility. This is illustrated in Table 3,
where we perform regressions of the strategies’ wealth against
volatility using daily values for the time series shown in
Figure 5A. For volatility R2 = 0.79 and for mispricing
R2 = 0.33. In both cases the value investor wealth and
the trend follower wealth have large coefficients (in absolute
value) and the fit is overwhelmingly statistically significant.
The noise trader is also highly statistically significant but
the coefficients and the t-statistics are more than an order of
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Fig. 5. How fluctuations in the ecology cause market malfunc-
tions. Panel A gives a color map of the price volatility over the wealth landscape;
the volatility is low and constant throughout the lower right part of the diagram, where
the system spends most of its time, but there is a high volatility region running
across the upper left. A sample trajectory spanning 200 years beginning at the
efficient equilibrium is shown in black. The noise caused by statistical fluctuations
in performance causes large deviations from equilibrium and excursions into the
high volatility region. Panel B shows the volatility of this trajectory as a function of
time, plotted against the predicted volatility from equation (11). Panel C shows the
actual mispricing plotted against the predicted mispricing from equation (12). Panel
D shows the wealth of the value investors and trend followers.
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Table 3. Multivariate regressions with volatility and mispricing as
dependent variables and the funds’ wealth as independent variables.
volatility R2 = 0.79 observations: 50,397
independent variable coefficient t
noise trader 2.4 10
value investor -68 -249
trend follower 107 169
mispricing R2 = 0.33 observations: 50,397
independent variable coefficient t
noise trader -0.15 -18
value investor -1.02 -107
trend follower 1.5 69
magnitude smaller. In Figure 5B and C we compare a time
series of the predicted volatility and predicted mispricing,
νˆ = −68wvi + 107wtf + 2.4wnt, [11]
mˆ = −1.02wvi + 1.5wtf − 0.15wnt, [12]
against the actual values. The series match very well. Note
that in both cases the coefficient for trend followers is positive,
indicating that they drive instabilities, and the coefficient
for value investors is negative, indicating their stabilizing
influence.
Nonetheless, due to their effect on the population of value
investors, the net effect of the trend followers on market
malfunctions is not obvious. In Figure 5D we plot the wealth
of value investors and trend followers. The strong mutualism
predicted by the community matrix is clearly evident from the
fact that the wealth of trend followers and value investors rises
and falls together. However, their dynamics are quite different
– there are several precipitous drops in the value investors’
wealth, whereas the trend followers tend to take more gradual
losses. As predicted, the highest volatility episodes happen
when the value investors’ wealth drops sharply while the trend
followers’ wealth is high.
Discussion
Our analysis here demonstrates how understanding fluctu-
ations of the wealth of the strategies in the ecology can
help us predict market malfunctions such as mispricings and
endogenously generated clustered volatility. The toy model
that we study here is simple and highly stylized, but it
illustrates how one can import ideas from ecology to better
understand financial markets. Our analysis of this model
illustrates several properties of market ecologies that we
hypothesize are likely to be true in more general settings.
This model gives important insights into how deviations
from market efficiency occur and how they affect prices.
While the market may be close to efficiency in the sense
that the excess returns to any given strategy are small, there
can nonetheless be substantial deviations in the wealth of
different strategies, that can cause excess volatility and market
instability.
Market ecology is a complement rather than a substitute
for the theory of market efficiency. There are circumstances,
such as pricing options, where market efficiency is a useful
hypothesis. Market ecology, in contrast, provides insight into
how and why markets deviate from efficiency, and what the
consequences of this are. It can be used to explain the time
dependence in the returns of trading strategies, and in some
cases it can be used to explain market malfunctions. One of
our main innovations here is to demonstrate how to compute
the community matrix and the trophic web, which provide
insight into the interactions of strategies.
There are so far only a few examples of empirical studies
of market ecologies (28, 29). This is because such a study
requires counterparty identifiers on transactions in order to
know who traded with whom. Trying to study a market
ecology without such data is like trying to study a biological
ecology in which one can observe that an animal ate another
animal without any information about the types of animals
involved. Unfortunately, for markets such data is difficult for
most researchers to obtain.
Regulators potentially have access to the balance sheets
of all market participants, which can allow them to track the
ecology of the markets they regulate in detail. Ideas such
as those presented here could provide valuable insight into
when markets are in danger of failure, and make it possible
to construct models for the ecological effect of innovations,
e.g. the introduction of new types of assets such as mortgage-
backed securities.
One of our most striking results is that the approach to
efficiency is highly uncertain and exceedingly slow. As already
pointed out, this should be obvious from a straightforward
statistical analysis, but it is not widely appreciated. Our
results demonstrate this dramatically and they indicate that,
even in the long-term, we should expect large deviations from
efficiency.
There are many possible extensions to this work. An
obvious follow up is to explore a larger space of strategies, or to
let new strategies evolve in an open-ended way through time.
Does the process of strategy innovation tend to stabilize or
destabilize markets? Another follow up is to construct a model
that is empirically validated against data with counterparty
identifiers. Our analysis here provides concepts and methods
that could be used to interpret the behavior of real world
examples.
Materials and Methods
1. Accounting and Balance Sheets.
The funds in our model use a stylized balance sheet that is presented
in table 4. External investors endow the fund with a certain amount
of equity capital E, in the forms of cash C in dollars and a number
of trading securities S. When S > 0, the fund holds this amount of
securities, and when S < 0, it has borrowed this amount from other
market participants to create a short position. In order to guarantee
that the short-selling fund can return the borrowed securities to
the lender at a later time, the fund sets aside a margin amount M
equal to the current market value of the borrowings, in the form of
cash. Fund managers may decide to borrow cash L up to a certain
multiple of fund equity. For simplicity, only one interest rate applies
to cash holdings, loans, and margin. This interest rate is the same
as the interest rate obtained from holding the risk-free bond.
Wealth is calculated as:
W (t) = C(t) + S(t)p(t)− L(t) [13]
The margin entry M(t) on the balance sheet does not occur in this
equation, as the margin account covers the negative part of S(t)p(t)
by holding its market value in cash. The funds can use leverage,
meaning using borrowed funds to purchase additional risky assets.
Leverage is a tool commonly used by fund managers, with a cursory
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Table 4. This table details the balance sheet items used by all funds.
All securities use the most recent market value in valuation.
Assets Liabilities
Equity
cash C capital K
Debt
margin M loans L
trading securities S+ borrowed securities S−
Table 5. This table provides a listing of the model parameters and
their values.
parameter value description
g 0.02 dividend growth rate
k 0.02 cost of equity
σ 6%
√
1
252 dividend growth volatility
ω 0.1 dividend autocorrelation coefficient
ρ 1− 6·252
√
1
2 noise trader mean reversion rate
σNT 12%
√
1
252 noise trader volatility
λ∗NT, λ
∗
VI, λ
∗
TF 1,8,1 leverage limit
cNT, cVI, cTF 5, 10, 4 signal scale
look at public regulatory filings of U.S. institutional fund managers
showing leverage ratios between 1 and 10∗.
The investment mandate defines the fund managers’ leverage
constraints, which may be set by the external creditors, who are
providing the fund with the needed loans, or internally – as a form
of trading risk management. Given the leverage constraint λ∗ ∈ R+,
we can compute the maximum and minimum demand, in terms of
the number of assets. Because we can have short positions, this set
of portfolios is more general than the budget set as it also allows for
negative amounts of the stock. The wealth of the fund develops as:
W (t+ 1) =W (t) + r [C(t)− L(t)]
+ [p(t+ 1)− p(t) +D(t)]S(t) [14]
The leverage constraint is an integral part of the excess demand
function. A fund can only violate its leverage constraint when the
proportion of risky assets changes faster than the amount of equity
capital. This can happen due to losses, or in rare cases when the
market fails to clear completely. In those cases, the fund has the
opportunity to reduce its risky position during the period via the
inclusion of the leverage limit in the excess demand function. There
still may be losses that exceed the fund’s equity, making the net
worth of the fund less than zero, and we require that all funds meet
the solvency condition W (t) > 0. The simulation ends when one
or more funds are insolvent. The model parameters, particularly
the leverage constraint λ∗, influence the observed dynamics in the
model. Table 5 lists the parameters used for the analysis in this
paper.
2. Market Clearing.
Prices are set by a price setter who chooses prices such that demand
and supply match as close as possible. The excess demand of agent
a for property i is defined in equation 2. The market excess demand
curve for one particular investment i is the aggregate of the excess
demand of all agents. As in the classical Walrasian setting, the
price setter seeks to match demand and supply, so that aggregate
excess demand is zero for each investment, by finding a root of the
market excess demand curve.
However, if no solution is found through the root-finding process,
we must fall back to a heuristic that seeks for the best solution that
only partially clears the market. We interpret the goodness of a
solution as the extent to which the solution minimizes demand and
supply mismatch. We here use the square of excess demand, and this
∗The Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR)
(https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml). Securities and Exchange Commission
way the root-finding problem is transformed into the corresponding
minimization problem:
minimize
p
(∑
a∈A
Ea(p)
)2
subject to finite p.
3. Model and Software.
The simulation in this paper builds on the Economic Simulation
Library, an open-source library for agent-based modeling which is
accessible at https://github.com/INET-Complexity/ESL.
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